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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE
CPLR 3101: Pretrial examination permitted in matrimonial action.
In Hochberg v. Hochberg,71 the Supreme Court, Nassau County,
rejected the deeply rooted, restrictive approach toward disclosure in
matrimonial actions and granted plaintiff-wife's motion for leave to
examine the defendant with respect to earnings and financial status.
Ordinarily, such a motion would be denied on the grounds that the
pretrial examination would be burdensome and that it would jeopar-
dize the parties' chances for a reconciliation. 2 As a result, while other
areas of article 31 were being accorded liberal interpretations, 3 dis-
closure in matrimonial actions was limited to those instances in which
a party could prove "special circumstances." 74
Undoubtedly, pretrial examination proceedings may still be
troublesome. However, under the DRL,7 r the parties must attend ex-
tensive conciliation proceedings before a matrimonial action can be
pursued. If conciliation attempts prove futile (and this is evidenced
by the fact that the matrimonial action is progressing), then the policy
ground for withholding the advantages of disclosure - the hope of
reconciliation -is no longer plausible.7 6 Thus, courts should follow
the realistic approach of Hochberg, while retaining power to issue a
protective order in appropriate circumstances.
CPLR 3130: Interrogatories prohibited in wrongful death action based
on breach of warranty.
CPLR 3130 proscribes the use of written interrogatories in an
action to recover "damages for any injury to property, or a personal
injury, resulting from negligence, or wrongful death." In addition, the
section prohibits the service of interrogatories if a bill of particulars
has already been demanded. These limitations evidence the reluctance
7163 Misc. 2d 77, 310 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
72 See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 7 App. Div. 2d 1011, 184 N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d Dep't
1959); see generally CARmODY-FoRKoSCH, NEW YORK PRACmCE 575-76 (8th ed. 1963).
It should be noted that it is public policy, rather than the CPLR, which restricts the
use of disclosure devices in a matrimonial action. H. WACHIELL, NEW YoRn PRACTICE
UNDER THE CPLR 238 (3d ed. 1970). Cf. Nomako v. Ashton, 20 App. Div. 2d 331, 247
N.Y.S.2d 230 (lst Dep't 1964).
73 See, e.g., Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430,
288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968).
74 See Hunter v. Hunter, 10 App. Div. 2d 291, 198 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1st Dep't 1960);
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 40 Misc. 2d 672, 243 N.Y.S2d 737 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1963); see
also H. WAcrTELL, NEW YoRr PRACricE UNDER THE CPLR 238 (3d ed. 1970).
75 DRL § 215(e) et seq. (McKinney 1967).
76 See 7B MCKINEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary 15 at 18-20 (1970); cf. Gleason v. Glea-
son, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970).
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